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Abstract
An improvement in the availability of opportunities for actors in a social system (e.g. a society or a
firm) can coincide with a growing rate of frustrated individuals. For instance, uprisings have repeat-
edly been preceded by forms of political liberalization that have provided greater opportunities (the
so-called Tocqueville paradox). In organizations, satisfaction with regard to promotion opportunities
can be negatively associated with objective chances of promotion. Raymond Boudon has proposed a
game-theoretic competition model, which specifies the micro-mechanisms that produce these puz-
zling phenomena at the aggregate level and clarifies the conditions under which they emerge. We
conducted three laboratory experiments to test the model’s predictions, making our study the first
empirical test of Boudon’s model. The results are mixed: when opportunities increased, the rate of the
relatively frustrated losers in the group remained constant, or increased only slightly. However, when
applying another aggregation rule, which accounts for all social comparison processes and does not
merely focus on the losers, an increase in relative frustration under improved conditions was
observed. Our results imply that under specific conditions, there is a trade-off between opportunities
and social mobility, on the one hand, and social inequality and relative frustration, on the other.
Introduction
Surprisingly, an improvement in a society’s opportuni-
ties can coincide with there being a larger share of frus-
trated individuals. The first to discuss this puzzling
phenomenon was Tocqueville, who claimed that the
outbreak of the French Revolution was triggered by eco-
nomic and social improvements (Tocqueville, 1952
[1856]). The factual truth of his historical account is not
at issue here, but his thesis is of general interest in the so-
cial sciences.1 The phenomenon whereby political re-
forms or economic improvements can lead to an
increase in the rate of frustrated individuals and, with a
certain probability, to uprisings, is called Tocqueville’s
paradox (Neckel, 2010). Brinton (1965) and Coleman
(1990) discuss several historical examples of
Tocqueville’s paradox. A recent example is China,
where rapid economic growth has coincided with grow-
ing dissatisfaction (Ishida, Kosaka, and Hamada, 2014);
as a consequence, Tocqueville’s oeuvre has become
popular among the party elite (Pei, 2013).
Related to the Tocqueville paradox is Durkheim’s
observation of rising suicide rates during rapid economic
growth (Durkheim, 1952 [1897]). The effect of more
overall frustration under improved circumstances does
not only appear at the societal level, it also appears
within organizations. In their study of social mobility in
the US army, Stouffer et al. (1965 [1949]) report the
classic finding that satisfaction regarding promotion
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chances was lower in branches with high objective
opportunities. Related, and no less interesting, examples
are discussed by Gladwell (2013).
There are two widespread explanations for the phe-
nomenon of greater aggregate frustration under im-
proved conditions (Esser, 2001: 432–437). The first
explanation assumes that frustration arises from intra-
individual comparisons of an individual’s expectations
regarding a situation with the actual state of affairs. For
instance, if, because of social improvements, expect-
ations grow faster than actual improvement, frustration
may arise (e.g. Durkheim, 1952 [1897]; Brinton, 1965).
The second explanation suggests that frustration derives
from inter-individual comparison. Stouffer et al. (1965
[1949]), as an example, proposed that soldiers evaluate
their situation in relation to a reference group—in this
case, promoted soldiers. A soldier who has not been pro-
moted and finds himself among a majority of soldiers
who have not been promoted, and only a small share of
soldiers who have, feels less dissatisfied than does a sol-
dier who has not been promoted but who finds himself
among a group containing a large number of people
who have been promoted (see also Pettigrew, 2015).
In the following discussion, when talking of frustra-
tion arising from comparison with either of the reference
points (i.e. an individual’s expectations or an individual’s
reference group), we use the term relative frustration. We
use the terms intra-individual and inter-individual relative
frustration when referring to either case separately. To
avoid confusion, we will not use the term relative depriv-
ation, which usually refers to frustration arising from in-
ter-individual comparison (Runciman, 1966).
Based on verbally formulated relative frustration the-
ory (e.g. Merton and Rossi, 1957), attempts to quantify
the theory were made. Several authors have put forward
the Gini coefficient, or a variant thereof, as a measure of
inter-individual relative frustration at the aggregate level
(e.g. Yitzhaki, 1979; Kakwani, 1984; see D’Ambrosio
and Frick, 2007 for a literature review and an empirical
application). Boudon (1982 [1977]: ch. 5)2 introduced a
game-theoretic model, which explains the puzzle of the
existence of more frustration under improving (or bet-
ter) conditions as the consequence of rational individual
decisions in interdependent competition situations.3 As
the opportunities in a social system improve, competi-
tion becomes fiercer, leading to more overall frustra-
tion.4 At a certain point, the direction of the correlation
changes and more opportunities are accompanied by a
decreasing frustration level. In short, the model predicts
an inverse U-shaped path of aggregate relative frustra-
tion when opportunities increase. This, however, only
happens under specific conditions. In other regions of
the parameter space, a negative association between
opportunities and relative frustration is possible.
While Boudon outlined his model in a rather sketchy
manner, Raub (1984) formalized it rigorously and ana-
lysed it game-theoretically. Raub demonstrated that the
core prediction of an inversely U-shaped rate of relative
frustration holds under different behavioural assump-
tions, and he specified the boundary conditions of this
phenomenon precisely. Kosaka (1986) relaxed the model
assumption of homogeneous actors and found that social
inequality between competitors dampens to some degree
the effect of greater frustration under improving condi-
tions. Yamaguchi (1998) demonstrated that this only
holds true when contest mobility exceeds sponsored mo-
bility (as defined by Turner, 1960), while the opposite is
the case when sponsored mobility prevails. Manzo (2009)
implemented the competition model as an agent-based
simulation. With this different approach, he replicated his
forerunners’ findings that the effect of greater frustration
under improved conditions only emerges in certain re-
gions of the parameter space. Moreover, Manzo (2011)
showed that network topology might impact both the
spread and intensity of relative frustration.5 Specifically,
social comparison in local networks, as compared with
global comparison, fosters relative frustration.
While the competition model has been analysed and
developed theoretically, to our knowledge there has
never been an empirical test of the model’s central impli-
cations. To fill this gap, we conducted three laboratory
experiments that test the central hypothesis of an in-
versely U-shaped path of relative frustration under im-
proving conditions.
Boudon’s Competition Model and
Hypotheses
The Model
We start with N actors facing a decision regarding
whether to invest resources, C, such as time, effort, or
money, in a competition for a scarce and highly valued
good, for instance a high-prestige position within a firm.
There are k prizes (e.g. positions) and n investors (com-
petitors). Because the good is scarce, it must hold that
k<N.6 While k is common knowledge, the number of
investors can range from 0 to N. Successful investors get
access to the scarce good (e.g. promotion) and therefore
receive the high pay-off a, which is given by gross benefit
B (e.g. prestige, power, or money) minus investment
costs C (see Figure 1; see also Hedstro¨m, 2005: 57).
Because the probability of success depends on the
total number of investors, the investment decision is
strategic in nature. If the number of investors n exceeds
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the amount of free positions k, some investors necessar-
ily fail to obtain a desired position. The losers are rela-
tively frustrated because of both intra- and inter-
individual comparison: first, their expectation of receiv-
ing promotion as a result of investing is disappointed.
Second, the losers adopt the successful investors as their
reference group; while for the same stake C, the success-
ful winners receive the high pay-off a, the losers receive
nothing in return. This is represented by the low pay-off
c. Sustainers (non-investors), e.g. individuals who decide
not to expend time and money on training to qualify for
promotion, will neither be promoted nor will they lose
any resources. They consequently end up with the me-
dium pay-off b. Formally, the pay-offs satisfy the
inequalities a>b> c.7
Individual investment decisions depend on the
opportunities provided by a given competition, which is
determined by the number of scarce positions k and by
the cost–benefit ratio Q:
Q ¼ B  b
C
:
Q expresses how lucrative the winners’ pay-off a is, in
comparison with the sustainers’ pay-off b, considering
the investment costs C.
The probability of success s, for a player who choo-
ses the strategy ‘investment’ is given by the ratio of the
number of scarce positions k to the number of investors
n. This is provided that the number of investors exceeds
the number of positions, and 1 otherwise:
s ¼
k
n
for k < n
1 for kn
:
8<
:
Note that all N players decide simultaneously whether
to invest. Hence, before the decisions are made, the ac-
tual number of investors n is unknown, while the num-
ber of positions k is common knowledge. The higher the
number of investors, the lower the chances of success for
each player.
Given a, c, and k, the expected pay-off E(k, n) for a
specific number of investors n is provided by:
Eðk;nÞ ¼
k
n
aþ n  k
n
c for k < n
a for kn:
8<
: (1)
With this information, the game matrix from the perspec-
tive of any player i can be constructed (see Figure 2). In
the matrix, the expected pay-off of the strategy ‘invest-
ment’ for each possible number of player i’s competitors
(n – 1) is depicted.
The model assumptions are in accordance with clas-
sical game theory. The rules of the game are common
Figure 1. Individual decision situation: the strategy ‘investment’ is risky and leads to the high pay-off a with probability s and to the
low pay-off c with probability 1 – s. The strategy ‘no investment’ leads to the medium pay-off b with certainty.
Figure 2. Game matrix from the perspective of player i. The expected pay-off E (k, n) is determined by Equation (1).
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knowledge, and each player knows that all players are
fully rational and maximize their expected utility.
So, what will a rational actor do in this situation? If
the expected pay-off of ‘investment’ E (k, n) exceeds the
sustainers’ pay-off b, independently of the actual num-
ber of investors, ‘investment’ is the dominant strategy,
which implies that all players will invest.8 For the case
that no dominant strategy exists, there is a threshold n*
with the property that, as long as a maximum of n* play-
ers choose to invest, the expectation of an investment
exceeds the pay-off b. So there are ðNnÞ asymmetrical
Nash equilibria9 in pure strategies, in which n* players
choose ‘investment’, and N – n* players choose ‘no in-
vestment’. Nevertheless, because homogeneous actors
are assumed and communication is not possible, none of
these equilibria is likely to be realized.
Rather, the rational solution lies in mixed strategies,
with an optimal investment probability p*. The mixed
strategy solution of this game is in accordance with the
rationality theory developed by Harsanyi and Selten
(1988). According to the axioms of the Harsanyi–Selten
theory, in a symmetric game, the solution must be a
symmetric Nash equilibrium. The mixed-strategy equi-
librium is the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium of the
game and, therefore, it is the rational solution according
to the Harsanyi–Selten theory.
Of course, there are other decision principles: a par-
ticularly simple one being the maximin strategy. Here,
the maximin strategy is ‘no investment’, which yields
pay-off b; the same pay-off a player expects when he
uses the mixed equilibrium strategy. However, maximin
is not an equilibrium strategy. If other players choose
maximin, it is advantageous to deviate and to choose the
strategy ‘investment’.
Both the maximin strategy and the mixed equilib-
rium strategy give rise to an efficiency problem. In a co-
operative game involving binding agreements, actors
would agree on an asymmetric equilibrium with exactly
k investors, who are, for example, determined by the
drawing of lots. Then, investors receive a, and non-
investors receive b. This is the Pareto optimal pay-off
vector with the welfare gain: kaþ (N k)bNb> 0.
However, without the possibility of agreeing on a bind-
ing contract, the Pareto optimal solution is not
attainable.
The counter-intuitive phenomenon that additional
positions lead to an increase in relative frustration
occurs if a small increase in k tempts an overly large
number of players to choose to invest and, as a result,
the increase in the number of losers exceeds, to a sub-
stantial degree, the number of additional positions.
Roughly speaking, this is the case if the benefit of the
strategy ‘investment’ is significantly greater than that of
the strategy ‘no investment’, while the costs of investing
are rather low; that is, if Q is sufficiently high.
Model Implications and Hypotheses
We illustrate the mechanisms discussed using two nu-
merical examples. Both of these examples have been im-
plemented experimentally to test the model predictions.
a) Mixed strategy case
Let there be a social system of N¼ 6 players choosing
whether to compete for one of k scarce positions.
Sustainers receive a medium-level pay-off, b¼ 6.5, with
certainty. Successful investors receive the high pay-off
a¼ 9, which is given by gross benefit B¼10.5 minus in-
vestment costs C¼ 1.5. Losers invest their resources in
vain and end up with the low pay-off, in this case
c¼bC¼ 5. The number of positions k varies from 1
to 5. In Figure 3, the game matrix for these parameter
values and the case of 1 position is displayed. The pay-
off of the strategy ‘no investment’ is fixed at 6.5, while
for a given player i, the expectation of ‘investment’ de-
pends on the total number of her competitors n – 1 and
can be calculated using Equation (1). If player i is the
only investor, she will get 9. Of course, the more players
that enter the competition, the smaller is the expectation
of the strategy ‘investment’ for any of the investors.
Evidently, ‘investment’ is not a dominant strategy: as
soon as two or more other players (i.e. in addition to i)
Figure 3. Game matrix from the perspective of player i. The expected pay-off E (k, n) for the strategy ‘investment’, given the number
of player i’s competitors (n – 1), is determined by Equation (1). Parameter values: k ¼ 1, a ¼ 9, c ¼ 5, N ¼ 6. The pay-off b for ‘no in-
vestment’ is fixed at 6.5.
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choose to invest, the expected pay-off of ‘investment’ is
worse than the pay-off of ‘no investment’. Hence, a ra-
tional actor will apply a mixed strategy.
The optimal mixture of both strategies can be gained
by exploiting the principle of indifference. If all players
choose to invest with the optimal probability p*, all play-
ers are indifferent between their pure strategies. This re-
sults in a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies (Nash,
1950). To derive p*, the overall expected pay-off of ‘in-
vestment’ E(k,), for a given value of k and all possible
permutations of investors, is equated with the pay-off of
‘no investment’ b (see Equation (2)). Solving for p yields
the optimal investment probability p* (Raub, 1984).
Eðk; Þ ¼
XN
n¼1
ðN1n1Þpn1ð1  pÞNn  Eðk; nÞ ¼ b (2)
Given one position, for the parameter values specified
above, the rational solution is to invest with a probabil-
ity of p*¼ 0.429 and to sustain with 1 – p*¼ 0.571.
The expected relative frequency of investors then equals
p*.10 Provided there are more investors than positions,
the rate of winners in a social system of N is given by the
ratio of free positions to the total number of individuals
(k/N), and the loser rate is determined by subtracting the
winner rate from the investor rate (p* – k/N). Should
the share of investors undershoot the share of positions,
every investor wins and there are no losers. Importantly,
Boudon defines the rate of relative frustration in a social
system as the loser rate, abstracting from the non-
investors.
For the parameter constellation discussed, the ex-
pected rates of investors, winners, and losers as a func-
tion of k are plotted in Figure 4a. If k¼ 1, as derived
from Equation (2), 42.9 per cent of all players are ex-
pected to invest. Because there are (k/N)*100¼16.7 per
cent winners, there will be 42.9 per cent16.7 per
cent¼ 26.2 per cent losers. When k is doubled from one
to two positions, the investor rate grows sharply, by
46.0 percentage points: the increase in positions leads to
an overly large increase in investors and thus to fiercer
competition. As a result, the rate of frustrated losers in-
creases by 29.3 percentage points. This increase is
sharper than the increase in the winner rate of 16.7 per-
centage points. Obviously, there are more additional los-
ers than additional winners, even though the number of
positions has doubled from one to two.
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Figure 4. Model predictions: rates of investors, winners, and losers by number of positions k. (a) Mixed strategy case and (b)
Dominant strategy case.
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If k keeps rising, the loser rate starts decreasing: as
soon as 100 per cent of the population is competing,
additional positions can only diminish the rate of the
relatively frustrated.
In short, the frustration rate follows an inversely U-
shaped trajectory, with a maximum at k¼2. We call the
situation discussed the mixed strategy case because the
paradoxical effect occurs at k¼ 2, where an equilibrium
in mixed strategies exists.
b) Dominant strategy case
In our second example, the winners’ pay-off a is
enhanced from 9 to 10, such that ‘investment’ is the
dominant strategy if there are two or more positions. In
this case, we do not need to assume that actors use
mixed strategies to deduce the hypothesis of an inversely
U-shaped trajectory of relative frustration. We call this
situation the dominant strategy case.
As depicted in Figure 4b, if there is only one presti-
gious position, 55.1 per cent of all players are predicted
to invest, assuming players apply mixed strategies.
Whichever decision rule actors follow in the case of one
position, if there are two positions, ‘investment’ be-
comes the dominant strategy. This means that for every
player, it is best to invest, independently of what the
other players do. Even if all of player i’s competitors
choose to invest, i’s expected gain from ‘investment’ is
still greater than the pay-off of ‘no investment’. Hence,
all six players will compete for only two positions and,
as a consequence, the level of frustrated losers reaches
its maximum (100 per cent33.3 per cent¼66.7 per
cent, compared with 38.4 per cent in the low-mobility
system with one position). If k keeps rising, more and
more investors are promoted, while there are no add-
itional losers. Again, the rate of relative frustration fol-
lows an inversely U-shaped functional form, with its
maximum at k¼2.
Importantly, the model highlights that an increase in
relative frustration under improved chances of upward
mobility does not necessarily occur. For instance, if ‘in-
vestment’ is the dominant strategy and all players invest
anyway, additional positions k coincide with fewer frus-
trated losers and more satisfied winners. Furthermore, if
the expected pay-off of an investment is not too tempting,
additional positions lead to a proportional investment
rate, and relative frustration remains constant (see
Supplementary Figure S1 in the online Supplementary
Data (OSD)). Hence, the model implies that, at the aggre-
gate level, there is no general law connecting opportuni-
ties to frustration rates. Depending on the parameter
constellation, social improvements can lead to a higher as
well as a lower frustration rate, or can leave it unchanged.
In our experiments, we chose parameters in a way
that maximizes investment, and, thus, frustration when
opportunities increase (for details, see OSD, Section 3),
to test the main model prediction of an inversely U-
shaped rate of relative frustration. More specifically, we
aimed to test the following hypotheses:
H1: The higher the number of positions, the higher the
number of investors according to the predictions of the
game-theoretic model.
H2: The rate of the frustrated losers is an inversely U-
shaped function of the number of positions, given the
parameter values specified.
Experimental Methods
We conducted three laboratory experiments. In the first
experiment, we implemented the parameters of the
mixed-strategy case (the first of the two numerical ex-
amples discussed in the preceding session) in a within-
subjects design.11 Because the results deviated somewhat
from the predictions (see below), we wanted to minimize
the chance that the design was responsible for this.
Specifically, giving feedback after each round of the ex-
periment might have affected the subjects’ investing be-
haviour. In Experiment 2, to exclude this we replicated
the experiment in a between-subjects design.
Additionally, we projected the pay-offs into the positive
domain to eliminate loss aversion. The third experiment
is a replica of the second case discussed in the preceding
section—that is, the dominant strategy case. In this case,
weaker rationality assumptions are necessary to derive
the inversely U-shaped path of relative frustration from
the model.
In Experiment 1, we compared competitions
with one position (low-mobility condition), two pos-
itions (medium-mobility condition), and five positions
(high-mobility condition) to test the hypothesis of an
inversely U-shaped rate of relative frustration. In
Experiments 2 and 3, we restricted ourselves to the
comparison of low-mobility systems and medium-
mobility systems, and omitted high-mobility systems,
so as to focus on the effect of an increase in the rate of
relative frustration under improved conditions. An over-
view of all parameter values and predictions is given in
Table 1.
Seventy-two students participated in Experiment 1,
and 60 each in Experiments 2 and 3. In each experiment,
subjects were randomly assigned to groups of six; separ-
ate competitions were held for each group. When all the
individuals of a given group had decided whether to in-
vest, k winners were chosen randomly from among the
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investors of the corresponding group. In the first experi-
ment, the participants played the competition game for
six rounds, while only one round was played in
Experiments 2 and 3.12
Relative Frustration in the Laboratory
Test of Hypotheses
For all three experiments, we report descriptive statistics
that are also visualized in Figure 5. Tests for statistical
significance were conducted by means of logit models.
The corresponding estimations are listed in Table A1 in
the Appendix.
In Experiment 1, as expected, subjects invested with
a higher probability as the number of positions was
increased (Figure 5a). The investor rate rose from 36.1
per cent in the low-mobility condition (k¼ 1), to 54.9
per cent in the medium-mobility condition (k¼2), and
reached 90.3 per cent in the high-mobility condition
(k¼ 5). Both the investor rate of the low-mobility condi-
tion and the investor rate of the high-mobility condition
differ significantly from the reference category (k¼2),
at least at the 1 per cent significance level. Nevertheless,
while predicted and observed values correspond quite
well in the cases of one (39.7 per cent predicted, 36.1
per cent observed) and five positions (100 per cent pre-
dicted, 90.3 per cent observed), there were notably
fewer investors than predicted in the medium-mobility
system (83.3 per cent predicted, 54.9 per cent observed).
Consequently, as depicted in Figure 5b, the rate of the
relatively frustrated losers remained roughly constant
when the number of positions was doubled from one
position (20.8 per cent losers) to two positions (22.9 per
cent losers, P¼0.748). Finally, and in line with the
model, the loser rate of 10.4 per cent was lower in
the high-mobility system in comparison with the me-
dium-mobility system (P¼ 0.025). In short, no inversely
U-shaped rate of relative frustration was observed.
Rather, the loser rate remained constant when the num-
ber of positions was doubled, and then decreased in the
high-mobility condition.
In Experiment 2, in the low-mobility condition, 50.0
per cent of the subjects chose to invest, while 80.0 per
cent entered the competition in the medium-mobility
condition. This difference is statistically significant
(P¼ 0.007), and the observed values approximate the
predictions of 42.9 per cent (k¼ 1) and 88.9 per cent
(k¼ 2) well (see Figure 5c). Furthermore, in correspond-
ence with the model, the loser rate of 46.7 per cent in
the medium-mobility condition exceeds the loser rate
in the low-mobility condition (33.3 per cent, see
Figure 5d). However, because more losers than expected
were generated in the low-mobility, and fewer in the me-
dium-mobility condition, the difference in the loser rate
amounts only to 13.3 percentage points, while the model
predicts a 29.3-percentage point difference. Because the
difference is not even half as large as predicted, it does
not reach statistical significance.
In Experiment 3, ‘investment’ is the dominant strat-
egy in the medium-mobility system, and therefore all six
subjects of a given group were predicted to compete for
only two positions. Despite this, as depicted in
Figure 5e, only 73.3 per cent of all participants entered
the competition. Because of this discrepancy, the loser
rates did not differ much between the low-mobility con-
dition (36.7 per cent, predicted: 38.4 per cent) and the
high-mobility condition (40.0 per cent, predicted: 66.7
per cent, see Figure 5f, P¼0.731).
To sum up, in all three experiments, investment
increased with the number of positions, which means
that Hypothesis 1 is supported from a qualitative point
of view. Nevertheless, while investment behaviour cor-
responds neatly with the model at the extreme points of
one and five positions, participants invested more
Table 1. Parameter values and model predictions in Experiments 1, 2, and 3
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Parameters
Winners’ pay-off a 7 9 10
Sustainers’ pay-off b 1 6.5 6.5
Losers’ pay-off c 3 5 5
Number of positions k 1, 2, 5 1, 2 1, 2
Group size 6 6 6
Predictions
k¼ 1 k¼ 2 k¼ 5 k¼ 1 k¼ 2 k¼ 1 k¼ 2
Investors (per cent) 39.7 83.3 100 42.9 88.9 55.1 100
Losers (per cent) 23.0 50.0 16.7 26.2 55.5 38.4 66.7
Note: Pay-offs in CHF.
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cautiously than expected in the medium-mobility condi-
tion with two positions. Consequently, frustration re-
mained constant when the number of positions was
doubled from one to two (Experiments 1 and 3) or
increased only slightly (Experiment 2). Hypothesis 2 is
thus rejected: the rate of the frustrated losers does not
follow an inversely U-shaped trajectory but remains con-
stant as positions are enhanced at a low level, and de-
creases in the high-mobility system—a result that lies
between the model predictions and the naive view of
decreasing frustration under improving conditions.
Beyond the Loser Rate: Gini Coefficient
Drawing on the literature on relative frustration dis-
cussed in the introduction, we questioned Boudon’s nar-
row focus on the loser rate. While we agree with
Boudon that the losers are the only ones being frustrated
because of disappointed expectations, the sustainers
might still be relatively frustrated because of compari-
sons with the winners. Boudon has acknowledged that
even though the sustainers might not be as frustrated as
the losers, they are also probably not as satisfied as the
winners (Boudon, 1982 [1977]: 115).13
As a measure for relative frustration in a group, the
Gini coefficient was suggested (Kakwani, 1984). The
Gini accounts for all of the three types of actors (i.e. los-
ers, winners, and sustainers) as well as for the different
degrees of relative frustration perceived by losers and
non-investors, by summing up the absolute differences
in the pay-offs in a group. That is:
XN
i¼1
XN
j¼1
dij;
where dij is the absolute value of the difference in the
pay-offs between actors i and j. This summation proced-
ure yields, after proper normalization, the desired
measure.14
We computed the Gini coefficient predicted by the
model and the corresponding empirical values for each
experimental condition in Experiments 2 and 3 (see
Figure 6 and Supplementary Figure S5, OSD). There are
problems with the interpretation of the Gini coefficient
in the presence of negative values, however. To resolve
these problems, in Experiment 1, we calculated the vari-
ance as a substitute.15
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Figure 5. Predicted and observed rates of investors and losers by number of positions for all three experiments.
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Let us look at the predicted Gini coefficients and
variances. In the beginning (k¼ 1), there are few win-
ners and few losers, and the sustainers prevail—the
group composition is largely equal. When positions in-
crease sharply at a low level (k¼2), the formerly equal
sustainers are divided into winners and losers. The dis-
persion in the pay-offs, and therefore the number of
comparison processes, increases. Thereafter, the sus-
tainers vanish, while the losers are diminished. Hence,
after a peak, the Gini coefficient declines with increasing
positions.
Not only the predicted, but also the empirical path of
the Gini coefficient and the variance, are inversely U-
shaped—at least in tendency. In Experiment 1, the vari-
ance increases significantly (P¼ 0.024), from 9.18 (pre-
dicted: 10.44) to 13.05 (predicted: 21.11), and finally
decreases to 11.44 (predicted: 14.12), although not statis-
tically significantly (P¼0.593).16 Note that even though
the increase in the variance from the low-mobility to the
medium-mobility condition is significant, this increase is
not as steep as predicted. In Experiment 2, the Gini rises
significantly (P¼ 0.006), from 0.106 (predicted: 0.098)
in the low-mobility condition to 0.140 (predicted: 0.142)
in the medium-mobility condition. Similar results are
observed in Experiment 3, where the Gini rises from
0.128 (predicted: 0.129) to 0.161 (predicted: 0.167)
when the positions are doubled (P¼ 0.025).
In all three experiments, the measures of dispersion
increase when the number of positions is doubled and,
in tendency, decrease thereafter. It is worth mentioning
that this pattern is in line with the Kuznets curve.
Kuznets (1955) argued that in the course of the eco-
nomic growth that occurs during a society’s transition
from a rural to an industrial society, the trend of income
inequality is inversely U-shaped.
Taken together, our findings suggest that Boudon’s
explanation of the puzzling phenomena reported by
Tocqueville, Durkheim, and Stouffer et al. might need
revision. While it is true that additional opportunities
tempt an increasing share of actors to compete, in none
of the three experiments was this increase as sharp as
predicted. Consequently, relative frustration, defined as
the loser rate, remained constant or increased only
slightly when conditions improved at a low level.
However, when not merely focusing on the losers, and
accounting for all comparison processes between losers,
sustainers, and winners, an increase in relative frustra-
tion is observed.
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Figure 6. Predicted and observed path of the variance (Experiment 1) and the Gini coefficient (Experiments 2 and 3).
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Discussion and Conclusions
An improvement in the opportunities offered within a
society (Tocqueville, 1952 [1856]) or an organization
(Stouffer et al. 1965 [1949]) can lead to an increase in
frustration at the aggregate level. Boudon (1982 [1977])
proposed a game-theoretic model to explain these coun-
ter-intuitive effects as the unintended consequence of
strategic individual decisions. As in a social system, the
chances of getting access to a scarce and lucrative good
(e.g. a prestigious position within a firm) increase, then
under specific conditions, the additional investors con-
siderably outnumber the additional positions. As a con-
sequence of this fierce competition, the rate of the
relatively frustrated losers increases and Tocqueville’s
paradox emerges. When the number of positions is fur-
ther enhanced, more and more investors achieve promo-
tion and aggregate frustration diminishes again. In
short, the model predicts an inversely U-shaped associ-
ation between opportunities and relative frustration.
To test the main model predictions, we conducted
three laboratory experiments with different parameter
values—the first empirical test of Boudon’s model, as far
as we are aware. In accordance with the model, in all
three experiments, participants invested with a higher
probability, as the number of opportunities was
enhanced. However, especially in the medium-mobility
system, where we expected the rate of the frustrated los-
ers to peak, participants invested more cautiously than
predicted. As a consequence, the loser rate remained
constant. When opportunities further improved, as ex-
pected, the loser rate decreased again. This result lies in
between the model predictions of an inversely U-shaped
rate of frustration and the intuitive belief in a decreasing
frustration level under improving opportunities.
Post hoc, we questioned Boudon’s conception of
relative frustration, which narrowly focuses only on the
losers of a competition. Following the received concep-
tion that relative frustration results from inter-individual
comparison, we operationalized relative frustration as
the Gini coefficient (Kakwani, 1984). In its essence, this
measure sums over all of the differences in the players’
pay-offs and, in doing so, captures all intra-group com-
parison processes. Summing over all differences is an al-
ternative aggregation rule and, applying this rule, an
inversely U-shaped rate of relative frustration is not only
predicted by the model but is also found empirically. An
increase in the Gini coefficient (or the variance, which
we used as a substitute in Experiment 1) when chances
improved was observed in all three experiments. This re-
sult is also in line with Kuznets’ (1955) thesis of an in-
versely U-shaped rate of social inequality under
improving economic conditions. Note, however, that we
derived the inversely U-shaped path of the Gini coeffi-
cient from Boudon’s model. Concerning the micro–
macro problem (Coleman, 1990), our modification dem-
onstrates the importance of the question of how to
transform individual decisions into macro-level effects.
The implications of the model at the macro level cru-
cially depend on the proper choice of aggregation rule.
Taken together, our experiments demonstrate that a
more favourable opportunity structure can indeed gener-
ate more social inequality, perpetuating relative frustra-
tion. However, as derived from the model, this is only
likely to occur under specific conditions (Raub, 1984;
Manzo, 2009), e.g. when the expected benefit of invest-
ing in upward mobility is considerably larger than the
benefit of not doing so, and when the increase in oppor-
tunities occurs at a low level.
Our study has some limitations. We tested model
predictions with a specific set of parameter values and
with (predominantly) Swiss students in a laboratory set-
ting. It is possible that the predicted effect of an increas-
ing loser rate would still occur when varying any of
these features of the design. Further, we focused on
whether investing behaviour changes with opportunities,
as predicted by the model, and elicited frustration only
by use of a verbal question. Introducing a behavioural
measure of frustration would thus be a natural next
step. Moreover, testing hypotheses derived from an ex-
panded version of the model might be of interest. Given
our results, mechanisms that reinforce frustration, such
as comparison in local networks (Manzo, 2011) would
be of special interest.
Finally, we would like to emphasize that Boudon’s
competition model is not restricted to the investigation of
relative frustration. Rather, it provides a conceptual basis
for theoretical and empirical investigations of the inter-
connection of competition structures, social mobility and
inequality, status processes, and individual decision be-
haviour. The model generalizes ‘winner-take-all markets’
(Frank and Cook, 1995; Lutter, 2013) and is a fruitful ex-
pansion of classic market-entry models that have been
previously used to describe situations such as these (e.g.
Fischbacher and Tho¨ni, 2008). It is worth mentioning
that Boudon applied a variant of his model to analyse the
effects of educational institutions on individual decisions
(Boudon, 1979: 55–60; see also Raub, 1984: ch. 5). We
believe that in the sociology of education, the competition
model could be useful as an interdependent counterpart
of parametric models (e.g. Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997).
Given the actuality and sociological relevance of these
phenomena, it seems worthwhile to further investigate
the competition model and to exploit it as a theoretical
framework for empirical research.
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Notes
1 Tocqueville’s thesis of an improving economic situ-
ation before the French Revolution is controversial.
Kruse (2005) states that there was an improvement
in economic conditions in the 18th century in
France but a period of stagnation in the 1780s (see
also Hobsbawm, 1972 [1962]).
2 For reasons of simplicity, we use the most parsimoni-
ous version of the model, where actors decide between
investing and not investing. In Boudon’s notation:
B2¼C2¼ 0 (Boudon, 1982 [1977]: 116–117).
3 Alternative explanations and models can be found
in Davis (1959), Davies (1962), Elster (1991), and
Gambetta (2005).
4 The model explains variation in relative frustration,
with variation in the opportunities of a social sys-
tem. Whether opportunities differ because of
changes over time or are cross-sectional is irrelevant.
5 See also OSD, paragraph 4.2, on the intensity of
relative frustration.
6 The two extreme cases are trivial: if k¼ 0, there is
no competition at all; ‘no investment’ is the domin-
ant strategy. If k¼N, every investor wins by defin-
ition and, again, there is no competition.
7 We tested the micro assumption that the losers are
frustrated, i.e. less satisfied than the winners and the
non-investors. The results suggest that this assump-
tion holds. More specifically, the winners report the
highest and the losers the lowest satisfaction, with
the non-investors in between (see OSD).
8 For all of his co-players’ strategy choices, a players’
strictly dominant strategy leads to a higher pay-off
than any other strategy available to the player (see
e.g. Rasmusen, 2007).
9 A Nash equilibrium is a combination of strategies,
in which no player has an incentive to unilaterally
change his/her strategy.
10 For a detailed illustration of how to derive p*, see
OSD.
11 As is common in experiments with monetary incen-
tives, we assume that, approximately, individuals’
utility increases linearly with money in the pay-off
range of the experiment.
12 See OSD for a detailed description of the experi-
mental design and procedures.
13 See also endnote 4.
14 The Gini coefficient is defined as:
1
2x
 1
N2
XN
i¼1
XN
j¼1
dij;
where dij is the absolute value of the difference
between person i and j. The Gini is 0 when all pay-
offs are equal, and approximates 1 with increasing
inequality. A meaningful interpretation of the Gini
coefficient requires a ratio scale with a meaningful
zero value, as with monetary pay-offs.
15 See Table A2 in the Appendix and OSD for further
details of our analyses of Gini coefficients and the
variance.
16 Here, we report results from the high-stakes condi-
tion only. In the low-stakes condition, the decrease
in the variance from the high-to the low-stakes con-
dition was more pronounced (p¼ 0.102). Note that
splitting the sample into a high- and a low-stakes
condition implies a decrease in statistical power.
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Appendix
Table A1. Probability of investing and losing, respectively
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
(1a) Invest (1b) Lose (2a) Invest (2b) Lose (3a) Invest (3b) Lose
One position 0.188** 0.021 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
(2.76) (0.32)
Two positions Ref. Ref. 0.300** 0.133 0.200** 0.033
(3.05) (1.29) (2.41) (0.34)
Five positions 0.354*** 0.125* – – – –
(5.76) (2.24)
Ngroups 12 12 10 10 10 10
Nindividuals 72 72 60 60 60 60
Ndecisions 432 432 60 60 60 60
R2 0.18 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.12 0.08
Note: Discrete change effects derived from logit models. Cluster-robust standard errors. z statistics in parentheses. Controlled for session (not shown).
*P<0.05, **P< 0.01, ***P< 0.001.
Table A2. Gini coefficients, variances, and results from statistical tests
Experiment k G or V Standard error Difference Result
1 1 V¼ 9.18 0.07 k¼ 1 – k¼ 2 z¼ –2.25, P¼ 0.024
2 V¼ 13.05 0.078 k¼ 5 – k¼ 2 z¼ –0.53, P¼ 0.593
5 V¼ 11.44
2 1 G¼ 0.106 0.01 k¼ 1 – k¼ 2 t(df ¼ 8)¼ –3.19, P¼ 0.006
2 G¼ 0.140 0.003
3 1 G¼ 0.128 0.014 k¼ 1 – k¼ 2 t(df ¼ 8)¼ –2.30, P¼ 0.025
2 G¼ 0.161 0.003
Note: G: Gini coefficient. V: Variance. Experiment 1: Cluster-robust standard error obtained by interval regression with parametric variance. Experiments 2 and
3: Unpaired t-tests.
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